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SALES AND TITLE AND THE PROPOSED CODE
ELVIN R. LArrY*
Tide, observed a well known writer on sales some years ago, "is still the funda-
mental factor in the law of sales."1 A reading of a group of judicial decisions dealing
with sales, taken at random, would no doubt justify that observation. Did title ("the
property") to the goods pass from the seller to the buyer at some point? That
question traditionally has purported to solve a host of issues in the law of sales; if
I may exaggerate for a moment, nearly everything in sales outside of "warranty"2
and a few other sales areas, seems to have turned on that question. In the law
schools, the course in Sales often has amounted to a course on the rules of tide-
passing 3 On the whole, the standard treatises have reflected this apparent stress on
title and tide-passing. This emphasis on a "pure" legal conception as a solvent of the
work-a-day problems of the market is reminiscent of the former preeminence in
corporation law of ultra vires,4 as well as of the concept of separate corporate entity,
invisible, intangible, existing only in the eye of the law.
The traditional preoccupation with tide-passing has not been without its
counter currents. Particularly since the publication of Professor Llewellyn's casebook
in i93or the potency and adequacy of title-passing as a realistic solvent have been
increasingly re-examined. A jurist of the stature of Learned Hand has observed in
the course of a strong judicial opinion: "'tide' is a formal word' for a purely con-
ceptual notion; I do not know what it means and I question whether anybody does,
except perhaps legal historians."6 Non-judicial legal literature increasingly refers to
*B.S. 1923, Bowdoin College; J.D. 1930, University of Michigan; J.Sc.D. i936, Columbia University.
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1 Waite, Book Review, 28 Micro L. Rpv. 947, 948 (930).
And even as to "warranty" in many states at common law title was (perhaps is) treated as of im-
portance with respect to the remedy available to the buyer. Thus, in some states, in an executory contract
of sale (where title had not passed), acceptance of the goods barred an action for damages for breach
of certain warranties. Distinctions in application of the rule became rarified and conflicting. Again in
some states, title-passing barred rescission for defective quality, in absence of other factors justifying
rescission. The dilemma in which the combination of these rules could put the buyer is well analyzed
in 3 WILLISTON, SALES §489 (Perm. ed. 1948). A notable achievement of the Uniform Sales Act was to
cure these common law defects. UNiFoRM SALES Acr §§49, 69.
.Of the two parts into which the contents of Williston & McCurdy's Cases on Sales (932 ed.) were
divided, Part I, entitled "Transfer of Property and Title," embraced slightly over one-half of the book.
Many instructors never get much beyond the first half of a casebook.
'At one time, a treatise on the entire law of corporations~tould be published under the name of
ultra vires; e.g., SEwARt W. BRrCE, A TREATISE ON THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VINS (2d. Am. ed. 188o).
'KAR.N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW O SALES (1930).
'L. Hand in In re Lake's Laundry, Inc., 79 F.2d 326, 328-329 (2d Cir. 1935). The court held,
over L. Hand's dissent, that a title-reserving conditional seller of machinery could reclaim the chattels
upon default despite the fact that the buyer corporation was in reorganization under §77B of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Had the buyer purchased by giving back a purchase money mortgage as security, the
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the barrenness of title. Also, one hears that a highly critical attitude to title analysis
is encountered in the halls of legal learning.7 However, to date few studies have been
specifically devoted to the critical evaluation of the tile-passing analysis in sales.
The title-analysis tradition, so strong at common law, persists with scarcely
diminished vigor under the Uniform Sales Act which, like its model the English
Sale of Goods Act, is largely a work of codification of common law attitudes. The
persistence is abundantly demonstrated by the judicial decisions under both Acts.
Into this traditional juridical culture that is prone to "talk title" upon slight provo-
cation, ventures the proposed Commercial Code with its deliberate belittling of title
as a solvent of sales problems. The Comment to the opening section of the Sales
Article of the Code expressly reveals that the purpose of the Article is to state legal
consequences "as following directly from the contract and action taken under it
without resorting to the idea of when property or title passed or was to pass as
being the determining factor."9 The Comment continues:
The purpose is to avoid' making practical issues between practical men turn upon the
location of an intangible something, the passing of which no man can prove by evidence
and to substitute for such abstractions proof of words and actions of a tangible character.
Accordingly, the Code's approach is to come to grips directly with every issue (or,
at least, nearly every significant issue) that traditionally has been solved, or sought to
be solved, through the title concept. Thus the Code has sections specifically devoted
to risk of loss, price actions, legal consequences of certain mercantile terms, and
other phases later to be mentioned.
To illustrate the difference in approach between the Code, the Uniform Sales
Act, and the common law (retarded or advanced), let us take a C & F contract
for iooo drums of codfish from St. Johns, Newfoundland, to Philadelphia, price
$io per ioo-lb. drum, payment cash against documents (the documents to include,
let us say, a negotiable bill of lading, seller's order, to be eventually presented duly
endorsed); let us assume that the shipment is lost at sea in transit by casualty not
covered by insurance; knowing this, the buyer refuses to pay when the documents are
tendered; so the seller sues for the purchase price10 The seller, we assume, lived
machinery would have "stayed in" the reorganization, as "property of the debtor," in the words of
§77B(b) (io). But here, because "title" was in the seller, the machinery could be pulled out. Such
decisions lead one to wonder about the functional virtues of analysis in terms of title.
7 Dean Prosser has stated to the writer that he had a standing rule when he was teaching the course
in Sales: never was the student to "talk title" in discussing a case, at least if the case involved the
question of obligations and remedies between seller and buyer. Apparently Dean Prosser's notion was
that if in such a case you can give no reason for a decision other than that title has or has not passed,
you are not giving much of a reason.
' The "Sales" part of the proposed Code constitutes Article 2 of the Code, as set out in the May
1950 Proposed Final Draft. In the discussion that follows, references to the "Code" are to the Sales
part (the Sales Article) of the Code and to the May 195o draft, as modified by the September r95o
Revisions, unless otherwise indicated.
' Cons, Comment to §2-Iox. By Article i of the Code, entitled "General Provisions," the courts are
specifically invited to consult these official Comments as aids to determine the underlying reasons,
purposes, and policies of the Code and as a guidein its construction and application.
1The above facts are suggested by Smith Co. Ltd. v. Marano, 267 Pa. 107, 1io Ad. 94 (1920).
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up to all the contractual obligations resting upon him relating to the shipment of
conforming goods. The issues thus presented are: is the seller entitled to recover
his price, as distinguished from his right to some other recovery if indeed he has
any right to recover at all; in turn, were the goods at buyer's risk or at seller's risk
in transit? Under the Code, the analysis would run as follows:
i. By §2-709, the seller is entitled to recover the price if conforming goods are
lost "after risk of their loss has passed to the buyer." So we look to risk of loss.
2. By §2-5o9, where the contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the
goods, "the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are duly delivered to the
carrier even though the shipment is under a bill of lading seller's order," unless the
contract requires the seller to deliver at destination (in which event, risk of loss would
pass "when the goods are there duly tendered"). So we look to see whether C & F is
a "destination contract."
3. By §2-320(3), a C & F contract imposes the same obligations and risks as a C.IF.
contract, except for the seller's obligation to obtain insurance for account of the
buyer. So we look to the Code sections relating to C.I.F.
4. By §2-320(2), which sets out a list of shipment obligations imposed upon a
seller under a C.I.F. contract, the inference is fairly clear that once the seller has
properly done all those shipment things which he ought to have done, he is in the
clear, and that a C.I.F. contract is not a contract whereby the seller undertakes to
deliver at destination. This inference is further supported and clarified by the
accompanying official Comment, which states that "the C.IF. contract is not a
destination but a shipment contract with the risk -of subsequent loss or damage to
the goods passing to the buyer upon shipment if the seller has properly performed
all his obligations with respect to the goods."
The result of the foregoing analysis under the Code, then, is that the seller in
the supposed case would be entitled to recover the purchase price. In all this
analysis, be it noted, there is not a word about "title."
Under the present Uniform Sales Act, the analysis would be along the following
lines. If title" has passed to the buyer. before the buyer's repudiation, the seller is
entitled to recover the price, under §63(I).12 Or, following the thought that the
seller is not entitled to recover the price if the goods were lost while they were still
at his Tisk, one then looks to §22: under that section the goods "remain at the
seller's risk" until title passes to the buyer (with exceptions not pertinent to the case
under discussion). So, in any case, we look to see whether title has passed to the
buyer. (Unlike the Code, the Uniform Sales Act has no sections specifically devoted
to C & F, either directed at specific legal aspects of C & F or to tide-passing under
" To be technically accurate, it is the "transfer" of "the property" in the goods that entities the
seller to the price under Uniform Sales Act §63(1).- That Act speaks of the transfer of "the property"
as between seller and buyer, but of the transfer of "title" as between the contracting parties and third
persons. See the headings under Part II of the Act, preceding §§r7 and 23. For the purpose of this
paper, we shall use the term "passing of title" to cover both situations, a terminology of frequent use.
"The other subsections of §63, specifying other situations in which a price action is maintainable,
would seem not pertinent to our hypothetical case.
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C & F.) We can readily dismiss any argument to the effect that the seller in our
case still had tide at the time of loss by retaining the bill of lading consigning the
goods to seller's order; by §§20(2) and 22, the retention of such security does not
prevent the passing of tide or the risk of loss. So, the general tide-passing sections
of the present Act would come into play, particularly §§18 and 19. Section A8 is to
the effect that title passes when the parties so intend, having regard to the terms of
the contract, conduct of the parties, usages of trade, and circumstances of the case;
while §i9 aims to help us discover the intention of the parties by laying down rules
for ascertaining that intention, with the always-overriding qualification: "unless
a different intention appears." Section 19 then lays down the rule (the closest to
our case of the five rules under §i9) to the effect that if the seller is to pay the
freight to destination, title does not pass till the goods arrive there13 Now, by the
very meaning of the "F" term in a C & F contract, one of the things that the seller
undertakes to do is to pay the freight to destination. (Although at this point one
might get into an argument: does $xo per drum C & F Philadelphia mean that the
seller prepays the freight to Philadelphia and the amount thereof is included in the
$io price, or that the seller simply subtracts from his bill the amount of the freight
which the buyer is to pay at the other end? Let us not belabor the point, except
to say that the present Act is silent and that'mercantile understanding seems to be
that the seller prepays freight.) 4 It might seem, then, that under the present Act;
title would not pass upon shipment under a C & F contract and thus the seller would
not recover the purchase price from the buyer in our hypothetical casejy But had
this been a C.I.F. contract, the seller probably would recover because, while the "F"
term in C.LF. points to tide not passing, the "I" term points to title passing, and
when you put them both on the scales, the "I" term is said to outweigh the "F"
term, thereby providing that "different intention" to which the rules in §19 always
give way.' 8 But the businessman will say that this difference in legal consequence
between C & F and C.I.F. is absurd; that it is even more absurd to make this vital
difference in legal consequences turn on imputing to khe businessman thoughts
about something he had no thoughts upon or intention of thinking about, viz.,
"title"; that C & F is understood to be just like C.I.F. except that in C & F the seller
does not obligate himself to attend to insurance details. Perhaps the court will sym-
1 6 UNIFOni SALES Acr §x9, Rule 5: "If the contract to sell requires the seller to deliver the goods to
the buyer, or at a particular place, or to pay the freight or cost of transportation to the buyer, or toga
particular place, the property does not pass until the goods have been delivered to the buyer or reached
the place agreed upon."
1" See Revised American Foreign Trade Definitions (1941) adopted by a joint committee representing
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the National Council of American Importers, Inc. and
the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., reported in 2 WILLISTON, SALES 135 (Perm. ed. 1948).
1r See remarks in Pittsburgh Provision & Packing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 260 Pa. x35, 103 At.
548, 549 (i918), to the effect that "C & F Pittsburgh" (from Kansas City) means the same as "F.O.B.
Pittsburgh"-which in turn presumably would mean, if we "talk title," that title would pass at destina-
tion under C & F. In this case, the rights of the parties were fixed before the state had adopted the
Uniform Sales Act, but there is nothing in the Act that would compel a change of judicial attitude.
16 Smith & Co. Ltd. v. Marano, 267 Pa. 107, z1o Ad. 94 (1920).
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pathize with him;17 if so, the court might seize an opening for allowing "usages of
trade" regarding C & F -to establish a non-tide-passing-intention of the parties; or
conceivably the court might find itself inclined not to resist an argument that Rule 5
of §i9 contemplates, and only applies to, terms dealing with delivery (e.g., "Delivery:
to carrier at St. Johns freight prepaid to Philadelphia") and that C & F in the price
term makes Rule 5 inapplicable, hence tide passed on shipment as in the "usual"
case. s Or the court may find that the documents showed that insurance, in our
hypothetical C & F case, was to be effected by the buyer, hence that tide was intended
to be in him during transit. 9 It is readily apparent that these tide-locating diffi-
culties make prediction hazardous, to say the least.
If the law applicable to our hypothetical case were that of a state that has not
adopted the Uniform Sales Act, leaving us at common law, the analysis would, as
under the Act, run in terms of locating tide, with comparable difficulties in applica-
tion of the common law rules for locating tide. In such a common law jurisdiction
there are additional doctrinal troubles. For instance, there is common law authority
(and of not too ancient vintage) to the effect that the seller's retention for security
purposes of a seller's order bill of lading keeps tide in the seller even after shipment °
Moreover, resort to trade usages to ascertain intention at common law runs into
snags.2
The foregoing discussion illustrates the basic difference between the attitude of
the common law and Uniform Sales Act and that of the Code towards resort to tide
in order to resolve particular issues, such as risk of loss and recovery of price (and
many others). Despite the Code's minimization of title as a working tool, the Code
nevertheless contains a fairly elaborate section, §2-4ox, devoted to the "passing of
tide." Several observations may be made on this apparent concession to the tide
tradition. First, the section in question restates, the better to emphasize the point,
that the various provisions of the Sales part of the Code pply "irrespective of tide
to the goods." Since most of the legal issues, and certainly the most important ones,
traditionally resolved through tide are directly covered by specific Code provisions,
the areas wherein tide is of importance thus become greatly limited. Second, one of
this section's basic provisions, viz., that "unless otherwise expressly agreed tide passes
to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance
with reference to the physical delivery of the goods," seeks to select an objectively
manifested physical act as the tide-passing point. This is to avoid resorting to the
classical "presumed intention of the parties" about an intangible something that the
parties generally never thought about, viz., "title." Third, the Code recognizes that
there may be a legitimate sphere for the operation of "tide," that the eternal question
"? Cf. Clark, C. J., in Madeirense Do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Enrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399, 402
(2d Cir. 1945).
"As in Secor v. Charles H. Tompkins Co., 45 A.2d 117 (D. C. Mun. Ct. 1946).
"' Madeirense Do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Enrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1945).
"See cases cited in 2 WILLIsToN, SALES §3o5 n. 16 (Perm. ed. 1948).
"Barnard v. Kellogg, io Wall. 383 (U. S. 1870), is illustrative.
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of mine and thine will persist and that there may be existing situations or novel
situations which are not covered by the Code and in which, out of sheer lack of any
other legal tool, the courts may have to fall back on title as a solvent. Accordingly,
§2-4of's rules concerning title are a sort of residual catch-basin, applicable by its
very terms only "insofar as situations are not covered by the other provisions of this
Article."
Criticism has been made of the novel language of the title-passing section of the
Code, as requiring litigation to establish its meaning in those situations, not spe-
cifically covered, where title can still be of importance; criticism has also been
directed to the Code's elimination of presumed intention as determining the passing
of tide. 2 However, as to any matter which really is a significant element in a deal
in a practical sense (and not in the who-has-title sense) not only is the matter
most likely to be specifically treated in the Code but also in all probability it is one
where the intention, express or implied, of the parties on that point will be a sig-
nificant segment of their contract and hence respected under the Code. It is only
in the outer fringes that, under the Code, one has to fall back on title, and in those
fringes the location of title either by express agreement of the parties or by manda-
tory rule irrespective of agreement would seem preferable to the presumed-intention
approach.2 3 Few areas of law are more productive of litigation than the location of
title under the presumed-intention approach; to this day, despite the decisions under
the Uniform Sales Act, it usually takes a litigation to establish what was the title-
passing intention of the parties. Later comments in this article will illustrate this
point.
II
By minimizing the consequences of title-passing in most situations and by
abandoning the search for presumed intention about title-passing in the residual
cases, as well as by disregarding any claim of title-intention in some of the residual
cases, the Code does depart, as Williston has said, "from the long established tests
for determining title and the consequences of title or the lack of it."24 And the
5 Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Commercial Code, 63 HAstv. L. REV. 56z, 569 (95o).
"'Section 2-401(3) of the Code, as it appeared in the May, i95o Draft to the effect that "where
delivery is to be made without moving the goods, if the goods are at the time of contracting already
identified and no documents are to be delivered, title passes at the time and place of contracting," has
by the September, i95o Revision been qualified by the words "unless expressly agreed." WILLis-rOt, supra
note 22, at 570, in criticizing the previous mandatory aspect of §2-40(3) raises this point: if S contracts
to sell to B an identified Buick car at the end of the season, delivery to be taken at S's garage where the
car is, why can't title pass at some point after the making of the contract if S and B so intend? With all
due respect, I suggest that this attitude seems to make too much of tide as an end in itself, with too
little concern about the narrow issue that may be involved. If the narrow issue involved in the particular
situation is none of the issues specifically treated in the Code (including rights of purchasers from and
creditors of either S or B), the then Code rule of title-passing at the time of bargain, irrespective of the
parties' intention seems easier to apply and fully adequate to do justice and still respect freedom of
contract-unless one is convinced that this basic freedom should include freedom to contract about title
in vacuo disembodied from specific content. It will- be a rare case where parties will make a present
deal concerning an existing identified Buick and yet express concern about future passing of title, over and
above express terms about who gets what and when, and who bears the risk meanwhile.
- Williston, supra note 22, at 570.
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learned author adds that this is the most objectionable and irreparable feature of the
Sales part of the Code.25 This criticism would be particularly forceful if we could
agree that the traditional tide-passing analysis at common law or under the Uniform
Sales Act is working well. That is: (a) if the operative facts in sales transactions
that effect tide-passing afforded a good basis of prediction, in the light of the existing
rules concerning the role of intention and the ascertainment of unexpressed intention,
that a court will hold tide has or has not passed in specific cases; and (b) if the
determination that tide has or has not passed adequately performed the various
functions that tide location is traditionally expected to perform (i.e., automatically
settle questions like risk of loss, recovery of price, reclamation in bankruptcy, main-
tenance of replevin, measure of damages, etc.), then the present situation would be
working well and would need no drastic overhauling. At the most, the situation
would call for adoption of the Uniform Sales Act in those states that have not yet
adopted the Act, and perhaps some minor amendment of that Act.
On the surface the present tide-analysis approach looks good. The rules of
the Uniform Sales Act and their common law counterparts (with the varying
degrees of conflict of authority that we have come to expect as natural) seem on the
surface easy to grasp. True, we sometimes have misgivings about the reality of
ascertaining the presumed intent of the parties about something that they didn't
think about, but we are accustomed to similar "finding" of the intent of the legis-
lature in statutes and of parties in contracts. Moreover, the judicial opinions on
tide-passing, in isolated cases, seem on the whole to "read well" and to come to a
"good" result. It is when you begin to dig below the surface that you strike trouble
and confusion; and the further you dig the greater the confusion; and while I
cannot claim where you end when you "exhaust" the explorations, I venture that
the more you explore the more you become willing to take either side on an alleged
tide-passing question in most cases. To pursue and present this thought fully
would require extended space; in the few pages allowed me, I can only give
illustrative examples.
In Glass v. Blazer Bros.,20 the written instrument of sale recited that "Blazer
Brothers has this day sold to Alex. Glass :their entire crop of growing flax ... to be
delivered at his elevator in Freeman, not later than September 15, at one dollar per
bushel. . . ." The market price went to $1.4o per bushel and the sellers, weak
against temptation, refused to deliver to buyer Glass at his elevator; indeed, they were
about to sell to others when buyer Glass brought this action of replevin-successfully.
Tide had passed, said the court. Now, by all the traditional rules of title-passing (as
well by the common law under which this case was decided as by the specific rule
of the Uniform Sales Act §i9 relating to contracts requiring a seller to deliver at a
particular place) tide ought not to have passed. That is, tide-in-the-abstract ought
not to have passed-sheer tide in the heaven of pure conceptions undefiled by such.
" Id. at 571.
26 0 Mo. App. 564 (19o2).
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mundane considerations as whether it is better to let the buyer get this flax or get
a judgment against the welching seller and satisfy the judgment as best he can.
The court's technique in "finding" that tide had passed is instructive. The court
pointed to the words "has this day sold" as showing a then-and-there title-passing
intention; in addition, it distinguished away those decisions where, said the court,
there remained something to be done as a condition precedent to the transfer of title.
Yet scores of judicial opinions either tell us that the words "has sold" as distinguished
from "has agreed to sell," are not particularly determinative, or else ignore the
phraseology (pointedly, I would say) when it leans away from the title-passing
decision.27  As for the "condition precedent" rationale, it seems fairly clear that
the court could as easily (indeed, more easily) have labelled delivery at the elevator
a "condition precedent." If these very goods had been destroyed by casualty before
delivery to the elevator, I venture that the court would have "found" that tide had not
passed. Is it, then, that tide may have passed for one purpose, viz., buyer's replevin
from welching seller, but not for some other purpose, viz., risk of loss or personal
property tax? Which suggests: was the court led (or misled, some might say) to its
tide position by sheer logic and analysis of tide-laden propositions or by keeping
a sharp eye on the end result and manipulating tide so as to conform? Passing of
tide lends itself readily to manipulation, for it involves "finding" an intention about
something that laymen in business deals don't think about and hence don't express
themselves about; and the typical situation presents factors which can be worked
up into sign posts pointing in opposite directions.
If the court in Glass v. Blazer Bros. was impelled to its decision not by title
abstractions (despite what it said) but by its balancing of the policies, pro and con,
on the narrow issue whether the buyer under such circumstances should be per-
mitted an action to get the goods as distinguished from an action for damages, then,
it is submitted, the holding of that case can best be stated not in terms of some
broad rule about tide-passing but perhaps as follows: "When the goods that are the
subject matter of the contract of sale have become identified, then the buyer (upon
making and keeping open a tender for any unpaid balance of the purchase price)
may recover those goods from the seller if the seller repudiates or threatens to re-
pudiate." Such a statement probably comes closer to "the truth" of that case than
some proposition about title-passing. The Code, then, in approaching specific legal
consequences directly instead of working through tide is not making a radical de-
parture after all, realistically. Furthermore, such a statement (or the opposite state-
ment, if a different policy choice is made by the court)28 is better attuned to the
"The classic case of Tarling v. Baxter, 6 Barn. & C. 360 (K.B. 1827) is itself an example.
" One could reasonably take the position, I believe, that there is little ground for "feeling strongly"
on the policy question involved in the Glass case. It is interesting to note that in the Proposed Final
Draft No. x of the Sales chapter of the proposed Code (draft of April 27, 1944) there was a section
(§72) to the effect that where the goods have been identified "the buyer may on making and keeping
good a tender of any unpaid portion of their price recover them if the seller becomes insolvent or
repudiates or refuses to deliver." Later drafts have abandoned this provision. However, the vitality
of that thought is still evident in the 195o draft of the Code, §2-502, to the effect that a buyer who has
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ends sought to be achieved by the title concept than is the use of that concept.
Moreover, such a statement (or, again its opposite or some qualification of it) is
less likely to lay the foundation for the development of conflicting rules and im-
penetrable entanglements of fine distinctions as decisions after decisions pile up;
consider, for example, the doctrinal developments that are likely to take place in the
court that has decided the Glass case if a subsequent case, almost identical on title-
affecting facts, presents the issue of, say, risk of loss or seller's suit for the purchase
price.29
Other decisions invite similar reflections. Thus, in Everedy Machine Co. v. Hazle
Maid Bakers,"° arising under the Uniform Sales Act, the seller made a machine to
fit buyer's specifications as per contract, which machine the seller was to ship when
completed. When the machine was ready, seller inquired how buyer wanted it
shipped, by motor truck or freight. (At this point, tile analysis would seem to
indicate that title has not passed, for seller has not shipped yet.) Buyer repudiated.
Seller sued for purchase price, and recovered. That this specially made machine
could not readily be resold for a reasonable price would seem to be sufficient ground
for the decision; indeed the court mentioned that ground. But the court's main
ground, apparently, was that title had passed; the court "found" the intention to be
that title was to pass when construction was completed and the buyer was notified to
that effect; that the matter of shipment was merely one of "subsequent arrangement."
The confusion caused by such a title analysis and the invitation to future refinements
to distinguish it away are readily apparent, particularly if such judicial analysis is
made in a state that has announced the doctrine that when several grounds for a
decision are announced, all are "the law."
In Hopkins v. Bronaugh." the buyer contracted early in December to buy some
$6o,ooo of bonds of specific issues. Seller was to mail the bonds to buyer about
December 23 or 24, to a specific place. At the time the contract was made, seller
did not even own or possess a good part of the bonds called for by the contract.
On December 20, buyer sent a check in payment. By December 24, seller had
obtained about $50,ooo of the bonds and put them in an envelope on which he
wrote the buyer's name, preparatory to forwarding them. Before seller got around
to forwarding the bonds, however, seller became bankrupt. The buyer sued to
paid part or all of the price of existing goods identified as the goods to which the contract refers may,
on appropriate tender of the balance of the price, recover them from the seller "if the seller becomes in-
solvent within ten days after receipt of the first installment on their price . . ." Also, the 195o draft con-
tains this provision:
§2-716(3). "The buyer may replevy goods identified to the contract if after reasonable effort
he is unable to effect cover for such goods or the circumstances reasonably indicate that
such effort will be unavailing."
(Another provision of that same §2-716 would grant specific performance "in other proper circum-
stances.") Here again, be it noted, recovery of the goods themselves under the Code does not turn on title.
19 If in the Glass case the seller, despite his refusal to deliver at the elevator as agreed, had been
suing for the purchase price, presumably no court would say: since title had passed, the seller is entitled
to recover the price; let the buyer, if aggrieved, counterclaim for the seller's refusal to make the delivery.
10 334 Pa. 553, 6 A.2d 505 (i939).
31 281 Fed. 799 (9th Cir. 1922).
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recover these bonds. The lower court held that title had not passed; the Circuit
Court of Appeals held that title had passed and that the buyer could recover the
bonds. Here again was a case where by the orthodox rules of title-passing, both at
common law and under the Uniform Sales Act (in force here at the time), one
would have predicted, most likely, that tide had not passed. Or is it that when
the buyer has paid in advance and the goods have become identified, then even if
the seller has not yet done all those things he ought to have done, title has passed for
the purpose of buyer's reclamation in bankruptcy but title has not passed for, say,
the purpose of risk of loss? The trouble is, at common law and under the Uniform
Sales Act, one can venture neither an affirmative nor a negative answer to that
suggested question; no one can tell when the court will hew to the title rules, ruat
caelum, and let the chips fall where they may on the specific issue involved. It may
be observed that the actual decision in the Hopkins case is strikingly similar to Code
§2-502?2
The Hopkins case is reminiscent of Young v. Matthews:"3 there Moxon, a brick-
maker, was indebted to Northen, who was pressing; so Moxon agreed to sell
Northen 1,3ooooo bricks. Buyer Northen sent his agent to the brick field, apparently
to look the bricks over; let the official report tell what happened:
Moxon's foreman.., pointed out three clamps from which he should make the delivery,
of which one consisted of finished bricks, a second was still burning, and the third con-
sisted of bricks which had been moulded but not burnt. Northen's agent then said,
"Do I clearly understand that you are prepared, and will hold and deliver this said
quantity of bricks?" and Moxon's foreman said, "yes." Subsequently ... Moxon became
bankrupt ... and Northen afterwards sold ... to the defendant, who removed them from
the field.
In an action of trover brought by Moxon's bankruptcy assignees against the
defendant, recovery was denied; from the foregoing facts the court "found" that the
parties intended to pass tide to the bricks then and there, despite that much had
yet to be done to put the bricks in a deliverable state. Here again, the seller's
bankruptcy administrator lost out in his claim to title where the buyer had paid
for the goods, even though payment here was merely by application to an antecedent
debt.3 4
An endless procession of cases could be added to those above, increasing our
doubts about the efficacy of tide and furnishing strong proof that the title approach
" Supra note 28.
"
3 L. R. 2 C. P. 127, 128 (1866).
" Under our Bankruptcy Act, such a situation today would raise a question whether the debtor had
received a fraudulent or voidable preference; and as between the seller's bankruptcy trustee and the pur-
chaser from the creditor-buyer (as was the defendant in this case), it would raise the question whether
the purchaser was a bona fide purchaser from the debtor's transferee for a present fair equivalent value.
See §§6o(b), 76(d) of Bankruptcy Act. CODa §2-402(2) expressly preserves the rights of creditors (and
hence of the bankruptcy trustee, to the extent that he gets creditors' rights by the Bankruptcy Act) "where
identification to the contract and delivery are made not in current course of trade but in satisfaction of or
as security for a pre-existing claim for money, security or the like and are made under circumstances
which apart from this Article would constitute the transaction a fraudulent or voidable preference."
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creates a magnificent illusion of certainty, if we judge by judicial actions rather than
by judicial words. The presumed-intention difficulty in these tide cases is not com-
parable to "finding" the intention of the legislature in a statute or of parties to a
contract about something that they did not think about on some particular point.
With respect to a statute or a contract, the court's job is to say what the legislature
or the contracting parties would have said on that point if they had thought about
it; or, perhaps, the court's job is to fill in with what it believes to be fair on that point.
In either case, there is some specific point to grapple with-something tangible, one
may say. But it seems pointless to ask: what would buyer and seller have said about
title if they had thought of it. It seems equally pointless to ask what would be fair
to find as to tide-intention. To ask what would the parties have intended, or what
is fair, as to measure of damages, risk of loss, or some other specific point, however,
makes sense. If resort to finding unintended tide-intention cannot be wholly elimi-
nated from the law of Sales, attempts to minimize the occasion for such resort are at
least to be encouraged.
III
SOME CODE TREATMENTS OF SPECIFIC MATTERS TRADITIONALLY RESOLVED
THROUGH THE TIT=E CONCEPT
In the remaining limited space allowed to this paper, I shall not purport to make
an extended commentary on what would be the analysis under the Code of every
situation in sales law that involves discussion of title-passing. That would mean
writing a treatise on the law of sales and several volumes of Code commentaries.
Also for brevity, I shall in the main forego extended quotation of Code provisions
which are frequently long and involved and full of cross references, in the belief
that any one sufficiently interested to read this article will have the Code available
before him.
Risk of Loss
In allocating the burden of risk of loss the Code draws a basic distinction between
proper performance under the contract and improper performance or repudiation
("breach"), the bad-actor being penalized with the risk of loss, tempered by insur-
ance coverage as later pointed out.
In the situation where there is no question about seller or buyer not having
lived up to his contractual obligation, the risk of loss in the cases involving shipment
passes to the buyer on delivery to the carrier unless the contract requires the seller
to deliver at destination. 5 This differs little, if at all, from the result reached by the
tide approach under the Uniform Sales Act or under common law, except that the
Code clarifies whether certain contracts are destination-contracts or mere shipment-
contracts.aO In the sale of goods which are in the possession of some third party
("bailee") and of which the seller is not by the contract obliged to make further
3, CoDE §2-509.
80 See discussion about C & F contracts, supra p. 15.
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delivery, the inference in the Code is that the risk of loss passes to the buyer upon
the seller's tender to the buyer of a negotiable document of title for the goods or, as
the case may be, upon the seller's procurement of the bailee's acknowledgment (to
the buyer?) of the buyer's right to possession;37 if the seller simply delivers and the
buyer accepts a non-negotiable written direction to the bailee to deliver, risk of loss
"remains on the seller until the buyer has had a reasonable time to present it.""8
If the case does not involve the shipment or bailment above discussed, then the Code
makes a sharp break with non-Code law; by the Code "the risk of loss passes to the
buyer on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant, otherwise the risk
passes to the buyer on tender of delivery." 9 So, if buyer B calls up seller S and says:
"I'll take that power lawn-mower I was looking at this afternoon; I'll pick it up at
your place in the morning," and S says "Good, I'll hold it for you," then, if the chattel
is destroyed by fire that night, whether loss falls on S or on B depends on whether
S is a "merchant.:"4 Merchant is defined in the Code as "a person who deals in
goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction"
or who employs intermediaries holding themselves out as having such knowledge
or skill,41 although by another Code section the provision affecting a merchant can
be extended to non-merchants "when the circumstances and underlying reasons
justify extending its application." 42 This definition has provoked criticism.43 One
wonders whether the definition was drafted more with an eye to the provisions
relating to warranty obligations,44 receipt of written confirmation as affecting the
Statute of Frauds,45 firm offers,46 written agreements to exclude oral modifica-
tion,47 etc. In the risk of loss situation the Code idea is, roughly, that if the seller
is a professional, and as such can be expected to be covered by insurance, let risk
of loss be on him until the buyer gets possession. Although there seems to be
enough merit in that idea to warrant the attempt to identify a risk-retaining seller,48
17 CoDE §2-503(4). This inference would seem justified not only by traditional law but also by the
express provision for delayed passing of risk of loss to the buyer in the case of a mere delivery order-see
text to note 38, infra.
S CODE §2-503(4). This would change such questionable decisions under the Uniform Sales Act
as Cundill v. Lewis, 245 N. Y. 383, 157 N. E. 502 (1927), where the buyer, for no explained reason,
delayed presenting the delivery order for some two weeks, yet risk of loss (theft from the warehouse)
was put on the seller.
*'CoDE §2-509(2). "Tender of delivery" is a term of art, under the Code; see §2-503(s).
o Before concluding that this is drastic, it would be interesting to see whether under the traditional
title-passing approach courts have "found" tide to pass sooner where the seller is a professional (a
business enterprise) than where the seller is a casual seller, in the risk of loss cases.
"' CODE §2-104(l) as modified by the September 195o, Revisions.
42CODE §I-102.
"Waite, The Proposed New Uniform Sales Act, 48 Micss. L. REv. 603, 617-619 (195o); Rabel, The
Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial Code, 17 U. oF Cut. L. Rev. 427, 431-432 (1950). See also
Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commerdal Code, 63 HAiv. L. REv. .56, 572
(950).
"'CODE §2-314. AS CODE §2-201.
" CODE §2-205. '"CODE §2-209.
" There is nothing new in the idea that insurance carriage can affect liability, even in minds loftier
than those of juries. In Tennessee and Colorado the rule seems to be that a charitable institution can be
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the Code's present definition seems to be less a provision of precision than an invita-
tion to courts to use their common sense in detecting a professional. 9 At any rate,
even with such ambiguous sellers as farmers, 0 query whether the proposed definition
of merchant will increase litigation. At present, suppose that farmer S contracts to
sell at $io per ton his entire present stack of hay to B, excepting 30 tons which are to
be kept out for S, B to take the hay right there where it is, the stack to be measured
next Monday; before Monday the hay is destroyed by fire, without fault; S has several
witnesses who can testify that they knew the amount of hay in the stack, say, 2oo
tons. Does the loss of 200 tons or of only 30 tons fall on S? (Let us agree that the law
is that if measuring is to take place merely to ascertain the price, that fact does not
alter any title-passing presumption otherwise arising, although even that is by no
means clear, either under the Uniform Sales Act or at common law.) Is measuring
off the 30 tons to be retained by S a "condition precedent" to the passing of tide, in
the light of the presumed intention of the parties?"' Even if the ascertainment of
the intention is a question "of law" for the court (as where the contract is in writing),
it will take a litigation at present to tell us what the law is.
With respect to the effect of failure to live up to the contract on allocation of risk
of loss, one phase of the Code substantially reaffirms existing law, viz., that where
liable for torts if it catties insnrance. O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium, xo5 Colo. 259, 96 P.2d
835 (1939); Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. 2d 284 (1938). See ap-
proval of the liable-if-insured doctrine in the later case of Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Couillens, x76
Tenn. 300, 140 S. W. 2d 1o88, 1092 (r940).
"As an alternative to the Code treatment, how about providing that pre-delivery risk of loss remains
with a "seller who is a professional producer or dealer with respect to those goods or is one who
carries or can be expected to carry insurance"? A number of cases litigated in recent years (but not
involving risk of loss problems) have involved sales of this sort: a railroad selling scrap, an enterprise
selling a part of its equipment or one item [e.g., a ship] or selling out its stock in trade. Query: "mer-
chants"?
"" A farmer would seem to fit the definition of "merchant," at least when he is selling his cash crops,
but the Comment to Code §2-509 observes that farmers generally fall within the category of "occasional"
sellers, "although under some circumstances they will be classified as merchants as to specific goods
and for specific purposes." In view of the somewhat authoritative force of the official Comments
under the Code, a court might here see an invitation to take a non-merchant view of farmers. Perhaps
the Code Comment should have been phrased the other way around: while a farmer may be a casual
seller with respect to some of his sales, he is to be viewed as a merchant with respect to sales of his
customary cash crops. A check in the Fifth Decennial Digest of the title-issue decisions involving
farmers (most of them not involving risk of loss problem) shows sales of this sort: several hundred
turkeys by a Minnesota turkey farmer, several hundred head of cattle by a New Mexico rancher, entire
citrus crops by owners of California or Florida orchards, daily pick-up of milk by dairy company from
farmer producers, sale of olive crop by California olive grower, sale of 2,400 sack grain crop. As against
these, there is an occasional case like that of the Alabama farmer who paid for his car repairs by "selling"
to the repairman his mare and farming tools.
But perhaps the Code draftsmen, wanting to get as wide adoption as possible of the Code, bad one
eye on farmer-sensitive legislatures.
"Iln Cassinelli v. Humphrey Supply Co., 43 Nev. 208, 183 Pac. 523 (igg), under the Uniform
Sales Act, title was "found" not to have passed under similar circumstances. Cf. Radloff v. Bragmus,
214 Minn. 130, 7 N. W. 2d 491 (1943), where title to a flock of turkeys was "found" to have passed
at the time of the bargain, despite the fact that no grading had yet occurred to distinguish the No. 2's
which were to bring 30 a pound less; result, the disaster of the Minnesota blizzard of November is, 1940,
fell on the buyer.
" E.g., consider the Cassinelli case together with the turkey case, supra note 5'. Incidentally, it would
seem that under the Code the loss in that case would have fallen on the seller, as a "merchant." See
supra note 50.
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seller's tender or delivery fails to conform to the contract, the risk of loss remains on
the seller53 (until the failure is cured or the buyer accepts). That simply restates
the result traditionally reached, through tide, by finding that title was not intended
to pass until the seller himself had properly performed. 4 But the Code presents
novel applications of the idea that default is to be penalized by risk-bearing, through
provisions the effect of which is substantially as follows: when one party as a result
of default by the other finds himself with unwanted goods on hand which the other
ought to take, the aggrieved party may treat the risk of loss as falling on the other
"to the extent of any deficiency in his [the aggrieved party'S] effective insurance
coverage,"55 unless a fuller risk of loss is already on the defaulter under some other
provision of the Code. The aggrieved party might be a rightfully rescinding " buyer
with the goods still on his hands57 or a seller faced with buyer's repudiation after
identification of conforming goods but before delivery. The Uniform Sales Act had
made some attempt to saddle the defaulter with risk of loss but the attempt only
went to default in delaying delivery, and the attempt raised embarrassing proximate
cause difficulties by its reference to "loss which might not have occurred but for such
fault."' Neither the Uniform Sales Act nor the common law geared the loss, shifted
or unshifted, to the aggrieved possessor's insurance coverage. It remains to be
seen whether sharp drafters of insurance policies will try to work out clauses to make
the insurance non-effective under these Code provisions.
Seller's Price Recovery
Under the Code the seller is entitled to the purchase price in three situations: (i)
where the buyer has accepted the goods, (2) where the goods are lost or damaged
after risk of loss has passed to the buyer, irrespective of his acceptance, and (3) where
seller's resale is impracticable.5 9
The first above situation parallels, more or less loosely, the non-Code law entitling
the seller to the price if title has passed. In abandoning "title" in favor of "accept-
ance," the Code no doubt hopes to make available a more tangible criterion. Whether
judicial decisions will justify this hope remains to be seen. Since by "acceptance" is
meant that the buyer "takes particular goods which have been appropriated to the
contract as his own" 60 and since acceptance is said always to include "acceptance of
"
5 CoDE §2-510(1).
"'Subject to the vicissitudes of title finding-recall the non-risk cases supra, notes 26, 30, 31, 33.
"eConE §2-510(2) and (3).
"' The Code avoids the term "rescission," "rescinding," and the like; instead it speaks of a buyer who
"revokes his acceptance," and of pertinent narrow operative facts and their legal consequences.
" At common law the risk of loss after the buyer gives notice of rightful rescission would seem to
be on the seller, in consequence of revesting of title in the seller. See Doane v. Dunham, 79 Ill. 13!
(1875). Likewise under the UNIFoRM SALs Aer, §69(4) and (5)-
"
8 UNIFORM SA.L.s Ace §22(b). For a good risk of loss case presenting facts which invite an entirely
different analysis of risk of loss under the Code from that under the Uniform Sales Act or common law,
see Rylance v. James Walker Co., i29 Md. 475, 99 Atl. 597 (i916) (under Uniform Sales Act).
"' CODE §2-709.
6 That is the meaning ascribed to "acceptance" in official Comment to §2-606; the term is not
defined in the text of the Code.
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title,""1 arguably the court is still invited to chase down title. However, the decisions
on the already-existing problem of what constitutes acceptance under the Uniform
Sales Act, as well as at common law, indicate that an acceptance controversy is much
more likely to relate to tangible overt acts than is pursuit of tifle.P
In the second above-mentioned situation allowing price recovery, price recovery
is tied to risk of loss if loss has in fact occurred. Even outside the Code, that tie-up
is a traditional one, through the familiar common denominator of title. But under
the Code, when loss has not occurred, one must be careful not to generalize that the
seller is entitled to the purchase price whenever risk of loss has passed to the buyer-
e.g., sale of goods (not falling in the third category) where for some Code reason risk
has passed to the buyer.
In the third category of price recovery are "goods identified to the contract if the
seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price or the cir-
cumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing."63  The ac-
companying official Comment indicates that it was meant to select a more objective
test than the corresponding words of the Uniform Sales Act, viz., "if they (the goods)
cannot readily be resold for a reasonable price."'64 The problem has always been with
us, with differing choices of policy and niceties of language. Writers have frequently
commented upon the superiority of this or that view, ranging from remitting the
seller in all cases to an action for damages (subject to permitting price action at least
after delivery and acceptance of conforming goods),"' through allowing price action
for non-marketable goods,6 to allowing price action almost as a matter of course upon
tender of delivery despite buyer's ante-tender repudiation. Judicial or legislative
authority can be found for each view. I believe that the Code, like the Uniform
Sales Act, wisely chose a middle ground"t-i.e., where the seller is "unable after
reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably
indicate that such effort will be unavailing." Within the policy so chosen there
remains the question: What is the best criterion of the impracticability of remitting
the seller to the remedy of damages or of resale-plus-damages? Despite its attempt
to be more objective in the standard chosen than was the Uniform Sales Act, the
Code's criterion bristles with that weasel-word "reasonable" and "reasonably." Per-
"
1 Official Comment to Code, §2-606.
62 See annotations in i-A U. L. A., SALEs (i95o) to §48 of Uniform Sales Act, on "what constitutes
acceptance."
3 COD §2-7 o9 (i)(b).
e UNiFost SALEs Acr §63(3), allowing price recovery even if title has not passed.
O'Such view has usually been couched in terms of "title"; if such attitude were to be adopted in the
Code, not "title-passing" would have to be chosen but, rather, acceptance or actual receipt.
66 Whatever be the language to approximate this thought, such as "not readily resalable for a
reasonable price," "specially made" for the buyer's unique requirements, etc. -
'7 If one had to choose between extremes, I find it hard to favor the Civilian and former New York
view which concedes the purchase price almost as a matter of course. While we need waste no sympathy
on welching buyers, it would seem to be the rare case where the aggrieved seller is not in a better position
to sound out the best outlets for the rejected goods-frequently even of specially made goods. On the
other hand, if a price action lends itself more readily to summary procedure than does a damage action,
there is much to be said for readier allowance to an aggrieved seller of the quicker action.
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haps there is no way to avoid the delicate balancing act always connected with the
word "reasonable"; it has been suggested, however, that a still more objective test
would be to give the seller a right to the purchase price if the goods have "no current
price. 68
Although in the impracticable resale situation it is only with respect to goods
"identified to the contract" that the seller has his purchase price action under the
Code, it must be observed that the Code gives an aggrieved seller faced with a
repudiating buyer the right to "identify" to the contract conforming goods on hand
even after an attempted repudiation.69 Presumably in the usual forced-sale case, i.e.,
where specially made goods are the subject matter of the contract, the "identification"
will frequently have occurred by making a start on the goods before the attempted
cancellation; the qualified right then to go on to earn the purchase price under the
Code is comparable to that under the Uniform Sales Act.70
The Uniform Sales Act allows a seller a price action simply by the calendar where
under the terms of the contract "the price is payable on a day certain," 71 irrespective
of tide-passing or other price-allowance factors. That appointed-day provision is
either an awkward rationalization of an abundantly justified price action in condi-
tional sales where the possessing buyer defaults before final payment, or is an
unquestioning adherence to some abstract notion of contracted independency of con-
ditions. Price recovery on such appointed-day grounds is denied under the Code;
apparently the Code's enumeration of cases where price action is permitted is in-
tended to be exhaustive.1 2
That still leaves the question, however, whether under the Code the seller can
maintain an action for the price simply on the strength of a no-cancellation clause or
similar clauses, usually boiler plate in sellers' standard prefabricated contract forms.
At their extreme, the sellers' clauses run to this effect: on any attempt by the buyer
to repudiate the agreement, the contract price of the goods becomes due and payable,
irrespective of lack of prior delivery or appropriation of the goods. There is
authority that such clauses support a price action, on the flat reasoning that by the
contract the purchase price "became payable" upon the buyer's repudiation; some-
times the above-mentioned §63(2) of the Uniform Sales Act is judicially cited as
squarely covering the case ("payable on a day certain"--and the day of buyer's re-
pudiation is that day); sometimes that section is judicially cited to show that the
e Rabel, The Sales Law in the Proposed Code, 17 U. oF Cm. L. RFv. 427, 440 (950). The sug-
gestion stems from the draft of a once projected international sales statute, as to which see generally
Rabel, A Draft of an International Law of Sales, 5 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 543 (x938).
" CODE §§2-704, 2-703. "Identification" under the Code would be quite comparable to "appropria-
tion" in non-code sales law (see Code §2-5o) if it were possible to disassociate "appropriation" from
title-passing.
1 0 Compare CODE §2-704, with UmFont SALES Act §64(4). For discussion under the Act and
common law, see 3 WILLIsroN, SALFs §589 (Perm. ed. 1948).
ilUNIFoRM SAL.s ACT §63(2).
" Official Comment to Code, §2-7o9.
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legislature could not have intended to invalidate a price-due-on-default agreement.73
Equally available, for a contrary conclusion, is the technical argument that the
buyer's promise to pay is, after all, only a promise, for breach of which he is to pay
damages, 74 with the corollary that there are limits to damage-fixing agreements.
It is not clear under the Code how effective the sellers' right-to-price clauses would
be. On the one hand, an official Comment states that the Code section governing
price actions "is exhaustive in its enumeration of cases where an action for the
price lies";75 on the other hand, the text of the Code itself has a provision that the
parties may themselves by their contract "provide for remedies in addition to or in
substitution for those provided in this Article. ' 76 Query what is the effect of still
another Code section to the effect that damages may be liquidated in the contract
but only in an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual
harm caused by the breach; 77 arguably a strong-arm price clause is in the nature of
a penalty. Query, too, what bearing has the "unconscionable contract" provision
of the Code, inviting courts to disregard "unconscionable" clauses.78
Rights in the Goods Upon Other's Insolvency
Intimation has already been given in these pages of the judicial tendency to
manipulate title into "having passed" where the buyer has paid all or a substantial
portion of the price before delivery. Other judicial techniques have also developed,
here and there, to protect the prepaying buyer. Thus, some courts have viewed the
seller's insolvency as a ground for granting specific performance to the prepaying
buyer, with varying degrees of concern or unconcern over the possible resulting in-
equality to the seller's other "creditors." 9 Some courts have given a buyer an
"equitable lien" on the goods in the seller's possession when the buyer's prepayment
of the price (or part of the price) had been made to finance the seller's production
of those goods, even though this might give the buyer a priority in these assets of
the insolvent seller as against other creditors80 And earlier drafts of the Code con-
tained a similar "enabling lien" provision on identified goods in favor of a financing
"'National Cash Register Co. v. Lyon, 257 App. Div. 273, 13 N. Y. S.2d 1 (Ist Dep't 1939); L.
Grauman Soda Fountain Co., Inc. v. Etter, 3 Ariz. 151, i6 P.2d 417 (932). The facts in the
National Cash Register case, in particular, lead to doubts about the wisdom of upholding strong-arm
price clauses; there the buyer repudiated the deal very shortly after making the contract and before
any tender of delivery, because he learned that his place of business was to be taken in condemna-
tion proceedings and accordingly he no longer needed a cash register.
"' Knight & Bostwick v. Moore, 203 Wis. 540, 234 N. W. 902 (1931), in which case the court gave
the silent treatment to Renne v. Volk, S88 Wis. 505, 2o5 N. W. 385 (1925) which had taken a different
attitude.
¢ Comment to Code, §2-709.
5 CODE §2-721.
"
1 CODE §2-720.
" CoDE §2-302. This section takes an important step in closing the cultural lag between lego-political
theory of the role of contract and the ihflexibility of mass transactions conducted through limitedly
authorized personnel in the hierarchies of commercial enterprise.
"'Horack, Insolvency and Specific Performance, 31 HA.v. L. Rsv. 702 (i9i8).
"
0Hurley v. A. T. & S. F. Ry., 213 U. S. 126 (i9o8); Grief Bros. Cooperage Co. v. Mullinix, 264
Fed. 391 (8th Cir. 192o). If the seller is in bankruptcy this would raise the question of the validity under
the present Bankruptcy Act of such an "equitable lien."
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buyer, though limited to one season or to a particular production operation."1
(Presumably the policy against secret liens led to abandonment of such a provision
in the current draft of the Code.) The foregoing indicates that the urge to do
something for the prepaying buyer upon the seller's insolvency has expressed itself
in one way or another, however clumsily. The Code, then, gives but a new twist
to an old idea in providing that a prepaying buyer can recover the goods themselves,
once identified, even though they have never left the seller's control (and, of course,
irrespective of "tide"), if the seller becomes insolvent within io days after receipt of
the first installment on their price. 2
When it came to the situation of the unpaid seller who had already made delivery
of the goods, it was more difficult at common law or under the Uniform Sales Act
to achieve a judicial manipulation of tide so as to protect the seller on the buyer's
insolvency by finding that tide had not passed. (Even here some room for play
existed within the concept of "cash sale".) What with specification, appropriation,
and downright delivery, even the flexibility of title offered little help to the seller.83
Perhaps he merited none; at least if considerable time had elapsed since delivery of
the goods, he could be viewed as a credit extender, like any other general creditor.
Even so, if the buyer went into bankruptcy soon after procuring the goods on credit,
courts came to the aid of the reclaiming seller by an ingenious "finding" that a
buyer in his financial position could not at the time of the purchase, have had an in-
tention to pay, hence the sale was rescindable for fraud.81  The Code handles the
situation of the unpaid seller who after delivery discovers the buyer to be insolvent
by allowing the seller within io days after receipt of the goods to reclaim any goods
received by the buyer on credit."s One notes the similarity in treatment to the case
of the prepaying buyer faced with an insolvent seller.
Seller's Resale, Damages, and Interplay of Title
At common law and to a considerable degree under the Uniform Sales Act, the
location of tide as between seller and buyer had a number of other consequences
relating to the seller's remedies, besides affecting his right to a purchase price action.
For one thing, in a buyer's suit for damages for seller's failure to ship the goods,
courts have inclined to talk about tide, relating the tide-passing place and time to
the place and time for delivery and hence to the place and time for determining the
market price. This, in turn, entered into the measure of damages, viz., market price
8
"May 1949 Draft, §2-402; April 1944 Draft, §55.
"
5 CODE §2-502(l). See also supra, note 28.
83 Even so, the flexibility of tide-passing was helpful to the farmers in the grain elevator "deposits"
faced with a bankrupt or otherwise insolvent elevatorman. The baffling legal confusion and rcfinements
regarding tide-passing that grew out of grain elevator cases is familiar knowledge. If one were forced
to make a generalization.about title-passing in this field, especially in the days before legislation in im-
portant grain states regulated insurance coverage and financial stability, one might say: if the elevator
burned down, tide had passed; if the elevatorman went into bankruptcy, title had not passed.
8' California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933), opinion by L. Hand.
"CODE §2-702(l) (b). Written misrepresentation of solvency made by the buyer within three months
removes thd so day limitation.
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minus contract price. So, in a contract looking to shipment from San Francisco to
New York, F.O.B. San Francisco, cash against documents, the buyer's damages
for the seller's failure to ship were held measurable by San Francisco prices;86 at
that place, said the court, title and risk would have passed, hence that place measures
the damages. What of a buyer who does not learn of such breach by the seller
until about the time the goods ought to have arrived? Obviously a more refined tool
for working out damages is needed than tide. (Indeed, a careful reading of the
case just discussed will reveal the court's recognition of this.) Here again the
Code has a non-tide approach to a buyer's damages: (i) if the buyer "covers" in
good faith by any reasonable purchase, the price which he has to pay measures
damages;87 (2) for seller's non-delivery, the price current at the time when the
buyer learns of the breach and does not cover is what counts;"8 (3) the place for
determining the price is the place for tender pr, in cases of rejection after arrival
or revocation of acceptance, the place of arrival.89
Title has frequently played a similarly significant role in the seller's resale situa-
tion. Take the case where the buyer wrongfully refuses to take delivery, the seller
resells at a price below the contract price and now sues for damages, asking the
difference between the contract price and resale price. If tide to the goods had already
passed to the buyer, it is fairly clear both at common law and under the Uniform
Sales Act that a resale made with reasonable care and judgment fixed the damages.
Two points are to be noted: (i) the resale did not have to be made at "the nearest
available market" to the agreed place of delivery (which normally would be that
place)-sale in some other market can still be commercially proper even if it appears
in retrospect that some "nearer" available market might have brought a better
price, and (2) the appropriate resale fixes the differential between contract price and
resale price, instead of being merely evidence of the "value" of the goods. But if
title had not passed, then this seller is said to be entitled to the difference between
the contract price and the value or "market or current price"90 of the goods at
the nearest available market to the place of delivery. There is also judicial language
about "best obtainable price." Theoretically, even a reasonable merchant-like sale
at the nearest available market does not fix for this litigation the value (or "the
market or current price") of the goods; worse still is seller's position if he did not
sell at nearest available market,9 ' or at some "best" market. So, the aggrieved seller
(and much the same is true of an aggrieved buyer) may be forced to litigate a
theoretical value in a theoretical market despite his actual, commercially decent resale.
Now, this unfortunate situation, where title has not passed, is by no means in-
evitable, either at common law or under the Uniform Sales Act. There are com-
s' Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co., 233 N. Y. 413, 135 N. E. 834 (1922).
sT CODE §2-712. "8 CODE §2-713(I).
9 CODE §2-713(2).
90UNIFORt SALEs AL-r §64(3)- While the Act (same section) speaks merely of "an available
market" and does not use the words "nearest available market," that still leaves an opening for common
law stress on nearest market when several markets are available.
"' See, e.g., Chapman v. Ingram, 30 Wis. 290 (872).
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mon law decisions that perrfiit a bona fide business-like resale to fix damages,92 or
that by virtue of presumptions of various degrees of conclusiveness, just about let a
seller's commercially decent resale fix the damages; one detects in the cases a strong
inclination on the part of judges and juries to find that the resale was in fact made,
or presumably made, in the best available or nearest available market. As for the
Uniform Sales Act, one can hardly say that it did much to clarify the situation; in
fact, perhaps, the contrary. Even assuming that §6o of that Act fixes damages by
the resale authorized by that section, it is by no means clear that §6o applies to cases
where tide has not passed to the buyer; 3 note that §6o recognizes the right of
resale by a "seller having a right of lien or having stopped the goods in transition,"
which suggests that §6o relates to cases where title has passed. If §6o applies
only where title has passed to the buyer, the measure of damages in cases where
title has not passed would seem to be governed by §64, which merely lays down
the general contract-price-minus-market-price rule, in absence of special circum-
stances. I shall not take the space to discuss whether §53(1) and §53(2), or even
§5i, of the Uniform Sales Act could be beaten into meaning that §6o applies even
to resale under an executory sale; 94 suffice it to say that it is regrettable that only
by tortuous reasoning can one manage to annihilate a distinction that should
never have mattered enough to give rise to discussion, viz.: title-passed v. title-
not-passed. Whatever difference in view reasonable persons might entertain of
the desirability of letting a good faith resale fix the damages, title location would
seem irrelevant.
Fortunately, some decisions under the Uniform Sales Act, not scanning too
meticulously the language of the Act, have taken the "fair and good faith" resale
as fixing seller's damages even in executory sales. 5
Under the Code, a seller's resale "made in good faith and with reasonable care
and judgment" entitles the seller, in plain language, to "recover the difference be-
tween the resale price and the contract price," 6 irrespective of passage of title. 7
Correspondingly, of course, the Code does away with title-passing distinctions
with reference to the notices of resale required from the seller to the buyer. In non-
Code law, as a corollary to the distinction about title-passing with reference to the
resale's fixing of damages, a resale where tide had passed would require more
:a See attitude expressed in Gussman v. Byrd Cattle Co., xx F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1926).
"To the effect that §6o of that Act is inapplicable where title has not passed, see L. Hand in
Farrish Co. v. Madison Distributing Co., 37 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1930). However, resale in that case
was recognized as fixing the damages because the goods were of a special kind for which there was no
available market, hence contract price minus resale price was "the loss directly and naturally resulting"
from the breach, under the language of §64(2).
"See Humphrey v. Sagouspe, 5o Nev. 157, 254 Pac. 1074 (1927).
'Obrecht v. Crawford, 175 Md. 385, 1 A.2d 1 (1938) is the outstanding case. It is disturbing to
note that this excellent decision has been adversely criticized for violating the "nearest available market"
rule, despite the fact the the seller had apparently done just what such a seller with such goods on hand
would have done in the normal prudent operation of his business in the course of marketing; see Note,
x6 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 497 (1939).
:"CODE §2-7o6(i).
7 CoDE §2-703.
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notification to the buyer of seller's proposed action than resale under an executory
sale,98 although the Uniform Sales Act has already just about abolished tide distinc-
tions on this score. 9
The Rescinding v. Rejecting Buyer of Non-Conforming Goods
If the goods are not what the buyer had a right to get and he does not want to
take or keep them, in familiar legal parlance he "rescinds" if tide has passed to him,
he "rejects" if tide has not yet passed. Importance consequences have flowed from
this distinction. Some of them have been minimized by the Uniform Sales Act,
which gives the buyer the right not only to reject a tender of non-conforming goods
but also to rescind upon his post-tide-passing discovery of the defect. Others remain
under, or are even created by, that Act. Thus, a rejecting buyer can recover
damages for breach of the warranty, but a rescinding buyer runs into trouble if he
seeks damages. He cannot both affirm and disaffirm, it is sometimes said,
although legal commentators have frequently raised the question: (why cannot the
buyer rescind the passage of tide and still stand on the underlying contract?
The Uniform Sales Act has not helped, to say the least; by its language which
apparently puts the buyer to a choice between rescission and other remedies.'o
Ingenious courts, true, have managed to save the rescinding buyer's damage action
by a number of evasive techniques, both at common law and under the Uniform
Sales Act;..' and it is not surprising to see courts straining to find that tide has not
passed.' 02 But a mere glance at the annotations under §69(2) of the Uniform
Sales Act shows the difficulty of predicting whether the court will find a way to give
damages to the rescinding buyer' 03 Fortunately, the buyer's rightful rejection
upon inspection at destination in the shipment cases (even in cases of preinspection
payment against documents) lends itself readily to a no-tide-passed analysis, thus
saving a large class of transactions from the dilemma.
Again, under the Uniform Sales Act, the rightfully rescinding buyer faced with
a seller who refuses to refund the price and take the goods back has a lien, with all
the lien-enforcing remedies of an unpaid seller, including right of sale.' °4 No com-
parable express provisions exist for the rejecting buyer. Fortunately, this does not
:$See, e.g., Browne v. Giger, 221 Ala. 176, 128 So. 174 (1930).
'UNIFORM SALES Acr §60(2) and (4). Perhaps the Act went too far in dispensing with notice in
all cases; compare Code, §2-7o6(3) and (4 )(b) & (3)-
... UNIFORM SALES Aar §69(2).
" Rogge, Damages upon Rescission for Breach of Warranty, 28 MCm. L. REV. 26 (1929); Notes,
38 COL. L. Rv. 888 (938), 33 MINN. L. REv. 406 (949). Notable is the tour de force of con-
scripting §70 of the Uniform Sales Act, a section which seemingly does no more than recognize damage
rules like that of Hadley v. Baxendale et al., in order to give the rescinding buyer recovery of his
special damages. See Russo v. Hochschild, 184 Md. 462, 41 A.2d 6oo (1945).
'"
0 In Tompkins v. J. & R. Lamb, 121 App. Div. 366, xo6 N. Y. Supp. 6 (3d Dep't 2907), the
buyer was only rejecting, said the court, and not rescinding, where he discovered that the granite was
not "Westerly" months after the monument was set in his cemetery plot.
2o3 i-A U. L. A., SALaEs (195 o ) notes 34 P. 303, 39 P. 305, 42 P. 306.
... UNIFORM SMEs Aar §69(5).
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seem to have handicapped the courts in giving the rejecting buyer the same resale
remedy as the rescinding buyer.' 5
Again, the Uniform Sales Act requires the rescinding buyer to "return or offer
to return" the goods, while it requires the rejecting buyer merely to notify the seller
that he refuses to accept' " Theoretically, this might seem to present pitfalls for
buyers, although no great embarrassment seems actually to have arisen.
Naturally the Code, in minimizing tide, seeks to abolish these distinctions between
rescission and rejection. Indeed, it avoids the term "rescission," and speaks instead
of "revocation of acceptance." A buyer who rightfully revokes his acceptance "has
the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected
them";10 7 the rightful rejector and the rightful revoker of acceptance are specifically
given the same remedies and the same security interest in the unwanted goods'0
The distinction between merely notifying the seller of rejection in some circum-
stances, as against holding the goods at seller's disposition in other circumstances, is
made to turn on physical possession (not on tide), with special provision for
"merchant" buyers.'09 But the significance of revocation of acceptance under the
Code can only be appreciated by careful consideration of the Code sections dealing
with what constitutes acceptance and the effect of acceptance, 10 as well as of those
relating to rejection and to remedies. Speaking of remedies, the Code might well
make it clearer that a rescinding (acceptance-revoking) buyer who suffers special
damages from the chattel's defectiveness can recover damages beyond those for non-
delivery."' True, by study of and cross-reference to a number of Code sections the
careful student can finally land in the right place, but the process is nearly as arduous
as making out a buyer's damages-plus-rescission right under the Uniform Sales Act.
Purchasers and Creditors
The "fraudulent" buyer, particularly the buyer who pays with a bad check, has
given rise to much litigation, legalistic discussion, refinements, and, basically, di-
vergent policy views. It is futile to seek a solution by definitions of "cash sale" or
through the "true intent" of a seller who was mistaken, or through estoppel or
through the "he who" rule (when one of two innocent persons must suffer, he who,
etc.) y"o There is a basic policy choice to be made where goods are sold by a seller
to a buyer who gives a bad check and who resells to a bona fide purchaser, when a
fight ensues over the goods between the latter and the original seller. One cannot
.. Czarnikow-Rionda Co. v. West Market Grocery Co., 21 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1927); Wilson & Co.
v. M..NWerk Co., 104 Ohio St. 507, 136 N. E. 202 (1922). In the latter case the court blithely labelled
the buyer's refusal to accept a non-conforming shipment a "rescission."
..
8 UNFoRm SALEs Acr §§69(5), 50. ""7CODE §2-608.
108 Cona §2-711. .. CODE §§2-602, 2-603.
..0 CODE §§2-6o6, 2-607. These Code sections relating to acceptance have been characterized as
"bewildering" by a penetrating analyst. See Rabel, The Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial Code,
17 U. or Cm. L. REv. 427, 434-437 (950).
"
1 1 See criticism of Code draftsmanship on this point by Waite, The Proposed New Uniform Sales
Act, 48 Micsr. L. REv. 603, 621-624 (1950).
... See Void, Worthless Check Cash Sales, "Substantially Simultaneous," and Conflicting Analogies,
x HAsr. L. J. iii (ig5o).
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help speculating whether more courts would have made the choice in favor of the
bona fide purchaser if so many of the cases, particularly the early precedent-setting
cases, had not involved the defrauded farmer-seller. The Code's choice that "no
agreement that a contract for sale is a 'cash sale' alters the effects of identification or
impairs the rights of good faith purchasers from the buyer"11 is a good choice.
Arguably, this still leaves open the question of what are fthe rights of good faith
purchasers; perhaps the September i95o Revisions, introducing into Code §2-403(i)
the provision that "a person with voidable title has power to transfer a good tide to
a good faith purchaser for value" helps clarify the "cash sale" section above mentioned.
Aside from a laudable predilection (which some might question, concededly) for
security of transactions, such a rule avoids refinements that other choices would
necessitate.
The Code further reflects the policy of security of transactions in the "entrusting"
cases. The Code scheme is, roughly, that if you entrust possession of your goods
to one who deals in goods of that kind, you will lose out (even if you don't give
that possessor "tide") as against a "buyer in ordinary course of business" from that
dealer; that the bad actor may be committing an act of "larceny" in receiving or
disposing of the goods is immaterial. 4 It is to be noted (I) that the "buyer in
ordinary course of business" is the one who is protected here, rather than the broader
(usually) category of "good faith purchasers"; and (2) that the protection goes to
such a buyer who buys from (directly or intermediately) an entrusted dealer.
Perhaps this will achieve a good middle ground between the diverse views found in
legal literature. A further provision seems to mark off a bona fide purchaser from a
"buyer in the ordinary course of business" by defining the latter so as not to include:
(i) a pawnbroker, (2) a person taking from one not dealing in goods of that kind;
(3) a person taking an interest in inventory in bulk or as security, (4) a person taking
at an hour or under other circumstances which negate good faith, or (5) a person
purchasing from a farmer. 15 The purpose of excluding from the favored class a
purchaser from a farmer is not quite dear, unless it be to distinguish such a pur-
chaser of effectively mortgaged farm crops or animals from an ordinary-course buyer
of items from a merchant's mortgaged inventory.P" Query whether this exclusionary
clause has the effect, intended or unintended, of protecting the seed company which
"bails" the seed to the farmer (and reserves title) against the innocent crop pur-
chaserSb Query, also, whether the pawnbroker exception extends only to his
transactions as pawnbroker or also to his not infrequent parallel lines of new and/or
second hand dealer.
The "cash sale" and "entrusting" sections of the Code are apparently not meant
to exclude the appropriate purchaser from the benefit of such doctrines (apparent
authority, apparent ownership, estoppel, etc.) as in our jurisprudence may create in a
transferor power to transfer "better title" than he has'
... CODE §2- 4 o1(i)(b). "" CODE §2-403(2) and (s).
"15 CODE §2-403(4). .... Cf. CODE §9-307.
"Cb Cf. CODE §§9-io5(h), 9-302, 9-303. ... CODE §2-403(1).
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Creditors' rights in goods that are the subject matter of sale are largely unaffected
by the Code, except in one respect: "retention of possession in good faith and current
course of trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable time after a sale
or identification is not fraudulent." ' Otherwise, local rules relating to transfers "in
fraud of" creditors still prevail, as is the case under the Uniform Sales Act.
The Code's Title Section, Concluding Remarks
Space forbids detailed discussion of the Code's title-passing section, §2-4o. The
foregoing discussion has suggested some reasons for its inclusion in an otherwise
title-less endeavor, and has emphasized its relative unimportance, particularly in con-
troversies between buyer and seller. Despite the importance of title in other areas
of law and the law's seamless webness, no great embarrassment should arise from
titie de-emphasis. Under bankruptcy doctrines, for instance, to the effect that the
trustee is vested with the tide of the bankrupt (plus additional powers), it would
seem that controversies over reclamation, risk, price, creditor-derived powers, etc.
between the bankruptcy trustee and others are not made more difficult by the Code.
In conclusion it should be re-emphasized that the lawyer's analysis of his sales
problems under the Code should not begin with a study of the tide section, §2-4oi.
One should stay away from that section as long as possible, first exploring all other
sections that seem to bear any kinship to the specific issue involved; only when satis-
fied that nothing else in the Codeis in point and that for some reason a title issue
has to be faced, should one turn to §2-4oi. Else one will rise to the complacency of
locating tide in one person only to suffer the intellectual denouement that risk, say,
is on the other. For many of us that is going to mean a considerable change in atti-
tude.
The Code looks like a more complicated mechanism, especially in the inter-
relationship of its parts, than the Uniform Sales Act, with reference to alleged title
issues. But superficial simplicity is not to be confused with adequacy or smooth
operation. The corporation law of the District of Columbia seems less complex
than that of California-until you try to work under it. The early statutes of
Minnesota, resorting to common law concept, simply stated that a deposit of grain
in an elevator was a bailment. It didn't work; successive revisions of the grain
elevator statutes became increasingly complex. This is a familiar phenomenon,
frequently leading to the specialist. Even for the lawyer who is not a specialist, how-
ever, I suspect that he can find his way around in the Code satisfactorily with less
time in its study than he would spend in locating tide from the judicial decisions or in
studying the refinements of cash sales and larcenous obtainers of possession.
... CODE 52-4o2(l).
